John Reiner, Director of Institutional Research
Transcript of Interview for 50th Anniversary History of SIUE
Interviewer Ellen Nore-Nordhauser
March 24, 2006

Ellen Nore [EN]: It's March 24th, 2006. I'm interviewing John Reiner. It's Ellen Nore for the SIU History. [Recording stops] Oh, I usually start by asking about how you happen to come to SIUE? I thought I saw you in the records as early as 1965-66.

John Reiner [JR]: Ah, you would have seen me as a Graduate Student uh in Carbondale. I started working on my doctorate in Higher Education in Carbondale in the fall of 1966. And my contract would have shown that I was an intern in the Office of Admissions and Records there. I did that for two years, and then, I uh was an intern with the Dean of the College of Education at Carbondale. So, that's where I got my doctorate.

EN: Okay.

JR: Ah, and as usual, if you get a doctorate, you're looking for a job that last ah, six months or so. And I had been wandering around the country, responding to interviews, you know, and visiting places. And had, had a number of job offers, and ah, Loren Jung, who was then Director of Institutional Research. And then is when the University was centralized ah, Institution Research reported to a man who, it was in Morris' staff. Okay. And Loren Jung talked to me and said he, "Had an opening at Edwardsville that he wanted to put an assistant director up here." And, "Would I be interested?" I said, "Certainly." And so, that's how I got the job and moved up here as Assistant Director of Institutional Research for the System. Um, I did a lot of traveling back and forth to Carbondale, but mainly, ah, I was, it was my responsibility to put things in order in Edwardsville that needed to be, to, in order to accommodate all the System's requirements, and particularly the [Illinois] Board of Higher Education requirements that were rapidly changing at that time. So, that's how I came to be here.

EN: Was this about 1968 then?

JR: I would, I came. I started work for Southern in June of '69. But, I stayed in Carbondale for about three, I guess three months, and then, I moved up here. So, it would have been.

EN: Fall.

JR: September or...In about October of 1969.

EN: Okay.

JR: Also, I had an appointment as Assistant Professor in Counselor Education.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Ah, that first office was a room much smaller than this [3003 in Lovejoy Library] out at, in a building out at Wagner Center.

EN: In Edwardsville? All the way out in Edwardsville?

JR: Yeah.

EN: Oh gosh.

JR: Yeah. And ah. They didn't know what to do with me. The, and then, as I started becoming more and more involved with ah, what I would call ah, you know, "management questions" that the Vice-President at that time had. That would have been Andy Kochman, the Provost. Ah, he moved me on to campus. So, I got into a closet [EN laughs] up on third floor of Rendleman Building with a secretary and ah sometimes, a student worker also, and that's ah, how I got going. The first few years probably, I was doing as many things for the central organization as I was for the Edwardsville Campus. Because I was bringing some insights and some skills that they needed at the time. That we were doing some things. And so, as I said, I was traveling back and forth from Carbondale. And I changed some things they were doing, [EN laughs] some of the ways they were doing certain things, and I computerized a number of things that they did not have... ah because, this was 1969, mind you. That you were kind of a magician if you knew anything.

EN: Yes. That's right.

JR: About computers in those years.

EN: How did you come to know about computers?

JR: [JR and EN laugh] Well, it's interesting. When I started my doctorate, the ah, everybody had to take two foreign languages right, in those days, to show a reading knowledge. Well, just before I started, they changed it at Carbondale. You could take two foreign languages, or a foreign language and statistics, or a foreign language and computer programming. So, in my first year, ah I took, I was taking Statistics because I had to, and I wanted to. I took a lot of it. And then in the second year, they changed that. So that you could take statistics and computer programming. They did away with the foreign language, which is, outside of the humanities, pretty much going on everywhere now.

EN: Yes. Right.

JR: Um, and so, I took a course, and I had to demonstrate a proficiency in a [computer] language. At that time, it was called Fortran. F-O-R-T-R-A-N. [EN laughs] And I did that, and I had to write this big humongous non-trivial statistical program to prove that I was proficient. [EN laughs] So, that's really how I got into it. Ah, in fact, one of my favorite stories from those days, when I was a Graduate Student. There's a guy by the name of George Counts.

EN: Oh yes. He's.

JR: He was a philosopher of education, wonderful man. He, he drove in a Model T or a Model A across the Soviet Union after the Revolution. Like in the 1920s, you know.

EN: Yes.

JR: He read *Pravda* and *Izvestia.* He got *Pravda* and *Izvestia. A*nd he was just, you could just stop in. He would, his office was right next to my departmental office. I would stop in and say, "Dr. Counts, how are you doing?" And he was just a great guy. I remember I was going across campus. In those days, we had card readers.

EN: Yes.

JR: We'd punch everything into the cards and take it over to him in the Computer Center. Wait a few hours or overnight, or a day [EN laughs] and get the results back. Um, and I was walking along with a bunch of cards, and he asked me what I was doing, and I told him. And he, and we talked about computing for a while, and finally, I said, "Well, I'll see you. I've got to get going." And he said, "I see, you've gotta get going." I got about 10 steps, and he yelled at me, "Reiner, you know, it just occurred to me that one of these days, we're going to have moral slaves. Computers will be doing the same kinds of jobs that slaves were doing at one time."

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And I, I'll never forget that. That was a very insightful sort of thing as far as I'm concerned. Anyway, that was my background. Educational Background. I got up here ah, as Assistant Director. That would have been 1969. And then now, the years, and I'm certain you have the right numbers on these years. I think in about... Morris was already fading by that time.

EN: Yes.

JR: It was obvious he was losing some of his powers. And of course, when that happens, you know.

EN: Yes.

JR: There are all sorts of people on the side-lines. Rendleman was ah, ah, Vice-President for Administration, or Business Affairs. Bob MacViker was Vice-President for Academic [audio cuts out] Affairs, Ralph Ruffner, I think was Vice-President for Student and Area Services. I'm not sure I have all of these correct.

EN: Yes. I think these are correct.

JR: Ah, and it, it became obvious. The stone house. You know the history of the Stone House. I'm sure you've heard it from a half dozen people already.

EN: Well, I haven't heard it from anyone. I've read about it. well..

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JR: Well lemme tell you.

EN: Yeah, tell me about it.

JR: Well what happened is, ah. And this was. That was actually the beginning of the end in many ways, I think, for Delyte Morris. And now I'm not sure of that. There might be many other things. But um. He didn't... He also didn't handle the unrest of the late 60s.

EN: Yes.

JR: The political unrest at Carbondale, very well. There were some errors made. But, ah, the University gets indirect cost money for all research grants right. All research and training grants. All grants.

EN: Yes.

JR: With indirect costs. Everybody understands that. Ah, and that money comes to the University for the University's use at its discretion, now generally speaking. Ah, that discretionary, those discretionary monies are usually put back into research in some manner. At Edwardsville, the researchers themselves get them.

EN: Yes.

JR: But there are a lot of different ways to deal with it. Ah, Delyte Morris decided that there was going to be a new university, ah, his his, a new residence and office for him, and he paid for it. And it was a million dollars or some such sum. It was probably more than that. I'm not sure how much it was. But it was called The Million Dollar House early on, and he built it, but he built it with indirect cost money.

EN: Oh, he did? I never did know that.

JR: Oh yeah.

EN: All I knew was that um, when the board, the board of. He blamed John Rendleman for giving him bad advice, and then the Board [of Trustees] confronted John Rendleman, and he took the rap. He said.

JR: Well, that could be.

EN: He said, "Yes, I gave him bad advice."

JR: That's entirely possible. Where the advice came from, is ah, I don't know. But ah, the mechanics of it had to do with indirect.

EN: That's interesting.

JR: It was indirect cost money. Now, I mean, that sounds like a big deal, but you have to remember that at one time, Stanford was called on the rug, on the carpet...

EN: Yes.

JR: For, ah, on the, on a University yacht.

EN: Yes.

JR: That was counted in the calculation of indirect costs. So, but anyway, now probably that was a big deal.

EN: Yes, it was.

JR: That could have very well been. That might have been one of the last straws, if you will.

EN: for the Board [of Trustees].

JR: Ah, now then, Clement Stone stepped in and donated a million dollars and reimbursed the University for it. And ah, you probably know Clement Stone's background. He was a very wealthy insurance person from Chicago.

EN: No. I didn't really know that.
JR: Yeah. A very powerful Republican. Ah, ah, and Morris. Moris, the way the University ran at that time, was a Republican and was really tied in with the Republican [Party], very tightly tied in.

EN: Interesting. [intelligible] told me that either.

JR: Ah, and Rendleman was ah, the ah, tied in very closely with the Democratic Party.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Between the two of em, they had an awful lot of political clout. I mean much of this, you know.

EN: Yes.

JR: Was rather informal. Ah, you know, there are no papers sitting around. "You take the Democrats. I'll take the Republicans." That sort of thing. But that, that's the reality of it. Anyway, Morris was forced out. [EN laughs] Am I going? Am I telling you more than you need?

EN: No, this is great! No. No. This is wonderful.

JR: More than you need to know.

EN: I was just thinking this. No. It's great.

JR: Ah.

EN: I need to know everything.

JR: So, Morris retired, and ah, they decentralized the University, with ah, Rendleman as President here [SIUE] and Macviker as President in ah, Carbondale. Now, I'm not quite sure what happened. What happened to Ralph Ruffner in all of that. Ah, I think he, I think he stayed at Carbondale as Vice-President of Student Affairs come to think of it.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Ah. When they, when they were preparing to make this move, they were deciding which offices should stay central. Now they wanted to de... now, Mor...and, and Rendleman, especially, wanted to have a decentralized organization because Carbondale was so dominant in many ways. Ah, they were trying to decide which offices should go where? Whether they, who should, which offices should stay central? There was, at the time, a pretty strong feeling at Institutional Research, and I was the Assistant Director of Institutional Research [IR], should remain central. Should remain with ah, what would become the Chancellor ultimately. Ah, but the ah, Presidents on the two campuses wanted it the other way around, so it ended up that we were decentralized. When this happened, ah, a guy that worked for Morris. Ah, a really wonderful person called, Clarence Stephens, came around and said, "John, here's the way we're going to do it. Would you like to be the Assistant Director of...or the Director of Institutional Research at Edwardsville?" I said, [JR coughs] "Sure," and that was it. That's not the way hiring would now be done.

EN: No.

JR: Now done. But ah, so that, that's kind of the way I got to where I was. Apparently the people of Edwardsville... By that time, I had, I'd gotten to know a lot of people here and had done a number of things with a number of people and ah, had some successes with some of our projects. Made a few enemies, you know [EN laughs]. They knew I was here. And apparently, the people here felt comfortable with me, and I felt comfortable. So anyway, I became Director of Institutional Research.

EN: And this was not, ah 1969?

JR: Well, no. That would have been about.

EN: '70.

JR: In probably 1971. Whenever, whenever and I cannot tell you the exact date.

EN: Okay.

JR: Whenever the two campuses became separate officially by the Board of Trustees.

EN: Well, that would have been... That probably would have been '70 or '71. I have to check the date.

JR: Yeah, I think it would be '70 or '71. Whenever, whenever, when they established two Presidencies and a Chancellor.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And ah, reorganized the university. When that became effective. Now, that's when all this happened to me.

EN: Okay.

JR: It's when I became Director, and I was working for Andrew Kochman.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Who was the Vice President and Provost.

EN: Who was the Director? If you were the Assistant? Oh, by that time.

JR: No. By that time. At that point, I was Director. Because they had established two offices, one here and one in Carbondale.

EN: Okay.

JR: The guy, the guy [Director] in Carbondale was still Loren Jung.

EN: Okay.

JR: Who incidentally is over at Columbia [the University of Missouri at Columbia]. He retired from Carbondale and then he went to work for the University of Missouri for I don't know how many years.

EN: Oh.

JR: And retired there as well. [EN laughs] And he's living in Columbia, Missouri. And he would really be able to tell you an awful lot of interesting stories.

EN: Oh. Good.

JR: Um, anyway, I worked for Kochman in Academic Affairs. And ah, that went for quite awhile. Until I think that, I'm trying to remem... now, now I'm getting hazy because ah, we were awfully busy.

EN: You did some of the first statistics on our institution.

JR: Oh, yeah.

EN: Yeah, uh-huh, in that period that's why I asked about the '70s.

JR: Yeah, there was nothing. Ah, there was nothing in the way of formal ah ah, numbers other than accounting numbers. Sure, the Registrar will tell you how many students that are enrolled and a number of things like that, but nobody ever put things together like describing the student body...

EN: Yeah.

JR: ah, demographics. None of that was being put together. And ah, also, at the time, ah, this becomes a little bit difficult to describe. The Board of Higher Education [IBHE] was in the process in those years, in '68, '69, '70 of defining, of of being charged with the ah, responsibility of defining costs for the University. Because, ah, the legislature was tired of individual universities coming in and crying for money. And and everybody was saying, "We deserve more. We deserve more," and of course, the University of Illinois was far and away the more powerful. The most powerful. And to do that the Institutional Research and [EN laughs] some of the budget people in, in, in the State formed a committee with the Board of Higher Education staff to develop a cost estimation model that would allow them to make better allocations, make better recommendations on funding to the Legislature. And part of that was what is commonly called the Statistical Report is actually an Effort Report on the part of faculty. Because the general, the general perception, common knowledge is, that you know, well, faculty teach. Well, faculty do a lot more than teaching, and this committee, we had endless, endless discussions about that. About all the things that faculty do and professional staff do and what, of the things they do. Rather the things that count as instruction. How do you count it? Ah, it...

EN: Mhm.

JR: It was a very complex situation. But the fundamental part of it was that Effort Report. And that was rather laxly done, I would say.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: At Edwardsville, they would put it into a pile and send it to Carbondale for compilation.

EN: Wow.

JR: And so, one of the first things I ah, tried to do was to get a little more formality, and a little more organization, to that Effort [Report]. And it worked out pretty well. You know, people in those days didn't really like telling anybody how many hours they worked doing this, that, and the other thing.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: But, ah. And I had some very interesting ah, confrontations [EN sighs] with folks, who came in and threw it on my desk and said, "How dare you?" You know that sort of thing.

EN: Yes. Well, these were. The beginning then of the Institutional Reports that faculty fill out every Semester. Or used to fill out every Quarter and then, every Semester?

JR: That's correct. That's right. You fill out. And I'm sure they still do. There's an Effort Report filled out every term.

EN: That's right.

JR: Yeah. And, and the reason for that is that we had made a very strong case in this com... and I sat on the committee.

EN: You were on the State Committee.

JR: Yes. That, that tried to define this, also not only that, actually they had done an earlier definition in the earlier '60s. I'm not saying that I was in the invention of, but this was a major overhaul because there were some obvious problems with it. Ah, the the, it was very important, I tried to emphasize this to people. It was very important to get an idea of how faculty distributed their time because that became the basis of what we would consider ah, when we calculated instructional costs, as opposed to research costs, as opposed to ah, public service costs.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Because there were different reasons and different um, ways of funding the three major functions of the University. Ah, and yeah. It became very important. It became critical. And then also about at the same time, in the early '70s, they, they being Illinois Board of Higher Education [IBHE].

EN: Mhm.

JR: Developed a brand-new budgeting model that relied very heavily on accurate reporting of ah, faculty effort.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And of expenditures by function: teaching, research, public service. So, I was involved in the, at the State level in committee, on a committee that put all this together. And ah, obviously, we were trying to be fair about it, getting the best possible measure of what was going on [EN laughs] and yet protecting our interests. I was most interested in making sure that what we were doing was accurately reflected [JR clears throat] in whatever came out of it. Everybody came to that meeting, you know, with that thought in mind. The University of Illinois came, and they used to say, "Hell, we've got the answers already. You know, we don't have to do all of this."

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: you know that was typical. Typical, I'm not sure typical. You often saw that attitude on the part of the University of Illinois people. They were good guys. And very bright, but pretty condescending generally.

EN: Uh-huh. Well, what I was wondering was, you were in these meetings. Is this where they came up with normative cost? Or was that.

JR: No. Na, the normative cost is another matter.

EN: Wait. Wait.

JR: I'm sorry.

EN: Just, ah.

JR: We'll come to that later.

EN: We'll come to that later. Well, okay you were in these meetings, how was the balance? It's always been a popular perception that the IBHE always tilts toward the U of I, or in our case, towards Carbondale. Um, and how? How? What was the balance? Did you feel that you were able to teach some of these people from U of I some things? I mean, did you? Weren't you somewhat ahead in terms of your knowledge of, of statistical [foundations] and?

JR: Well, during these. At the time we're talking about...

EN: Yeah.

JR: Which was really a restructuring of how to measure instructional costs and so forth.

EN: Yes.

JR: I can't say that I was in a position of teaching the University of Illinois. Many of the, ah, almost all of the ideas uh, that ultimately came out, and made up what was called the Unit Cost Study.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Still is. Were really kind of ah, put out by everybody.

EN: That's good.

JR: Somebody would put out an idea. I couldn't tell you who. I mean, we had the Regents. Was a, ah, Northern, Illinois State. We had some very bright people sitting around, throwing out ideas, exploring them. We'd come back and say, "Look, we've kind of thought about this." And so, [EN coughs] but the University of Illinois. The University, in all of this, I tried very hard to,

like everyone. I think everyone was doing this in good faith. I was trying to ah, propose doing things in ways that most accurately reflected what was going on.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Ah, I think. Yet, at the same time as I say, protecting what I considered Edwardsville's interests. I wasn't going to do anything illegal or dishonest.

EN: Yes. Yes.

JR: Ah, immoral or anything like that. But I wasn't going to do anything just to further Edwardsville's future, but I would do everything to make sure that what, what happened reflected what *we* were doing. And pretty much when you did that, you really kinda describing something that reflects what all universities do. The University of Illinois would always, um, well, I- I let me back up. One of the biggest considerations was the proposal that instructional costs were quite separate from research and public service costs. The University of Illinois. Now, given that, then, you would put, when you examined your budget, your institutional budget, you had to figure out a way to put the money into instruction, public service, and organized research. And when funding for instruction, you don't want to include the other [two, research and public service]. Their were formulas. They were coming up with formulas.

EN: You know, how to include...

EN and JR Synchronously: Research and Public Service.

JR: And ah, and so, Organized Research. Organized Research and that's a technical question that we can explore if you wish but...

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And public services were excluded. Costs from those were excluded. The, the tendency at that point was to put as much money into instruction as possible. And so, everybody's faculty, on all, there were 12 universities. I knew the guys at almost all of them very well. Everybody was telling their faculty look, be as honest as you can about how much you're putting into teaching. And then, but at the same time, you didn't want to get too high okay. [EN laughs] You didn't want to get too costly. So, at the same, it's a balancing act. The University of Illinois tended to be very expensive, obviously, for obvious reasons. Um, their teaching loads were much different than most the rest of the state. Being the kind of institution they were. And so, they did not want to cut, to end up being the dominant factor in the cost ah, calculations for the State, so they were putting a lot of money into organized research and public service. So, we went through a long, long couple of years of trying to define, or how we define "public service" and how we define "organized research" and so forth. The University of Illinois did not dominate ah, these discussions. Ah, they certainly were very important because they were the elephant.

EN: Uh-huh.

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JR: In the room in many ways. Ah, but Carbondale. Carbondale-Edwardsville. If if you look at the pecking order in the State of Illinois, the University of Illinois is ah the most powerful by any means. The most politically powerful, as well as economically and academically.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Ah, Carbondale, or ah, SIU was second. And ah, before they decentralized and gave everybody a Board of Trustees, Regents was third, and Governor's was fourth. Now, remember, you also have community colleges. Bunch of community colleges sitting out there squeaking for money too. That's kinda the way. And this report. The Statistical Report, with the Unit Cost Study, and by doing that, without getting into all the details.

EN: Yes.

JR: You could come up with formulas for translating estimated enrollments into dollars to fund them.

EN: Okay.

JR: Okay. Ah, and that's really what it was all about. They wanted to get to something that was ah, objective.

EN: Mhm.

JR: In the way of relating enrollments to funding.

EN: Mhm.

JR: That's really what it was, what this was all about. In the days before I ever started work, and even after I started work in 1969, when I started working here. In those days the universities were growing so quickly! I mean, you have, people don't really understand that Edwardsville went from 7500-8000 to 13,000 in about three or four years.

EN: Yes. Right.

JR: And what happens, when that happens, of course, the presidents come and say, "I need more money. I need more money. I need more money." Well, so does everybody else. And whose growing faster, you don't know all that.

EN: Yes.

JR: And also. Everybody understood that Engineering costs more to teach than ah, than ah, Political Science or History or Art or Music, theoretically. Everybody knew there were cost differentials across the disciplines. So, that's what this was all designed to kind, to kind of allow the Board of Higher Education [IBHE] to fulfill its role as making, in making budget

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recommendations to the Legislature, without, and by basing it the degree possible to something objective. Rather than just allowing people yelling that they needed more money.

EN: Okay.

JR: Ah, now that. That kind of. And then, from then on, once that started, once that started, and everybody was quite happy with it. Because the enrollments were growing and we were getting a lot more money. And everybody was just you know.
EN: Yeah.

JR: You know, thought, "This is wonderful!" Then, things started getting tight, ah, I would say by the mid-'70s, probably about the time that John Rendleman died [in 1976] things were beginning to tighten up in the way of money. And that Unit Cost Study, the same one that was driving all the money coming in, was used to compare costs across the twelve institutions in the State in reducing budgets. Or trying to say, " Hey. You're way above average. And so and so is way below average." And so, ah "Budget reductions recommendations will be made based on that." So, the same study that got us all the money began to, ah, show relative, or comparative costs across the State. That's where what you mentioned earlier as the Normative Cost Study. So, once the externals started using that, and early on, it was in a very unsophisticated way, they just looked at average costs. While, I'm going to oversimplify. Average costs took out organized research, took out public service, and they made comparisons. And we were looking very high, or very expensive I should say. In truth, we were. [EN laughs] I mean ah, without burning money and, or burying it or giving it back, if you spend it, it's going to show up under those circumstances. That was, that was the objective of the whole thing is to try to get an honest look at what we cost.

EN: Yes.

JR: So, that was becoming apparent by, by the mid-70s.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Um.

EN: Rendlemen died in, in March of '76, early March of '76.

JR: Yeah.

EN: March 6th. I think.

JR: Yeah. Yeah. In the spring. And our budgets were starting to take some hits about that time. Ah, and one of the. Of course, that spills over. Once somebody comes to the University and says, "You've got to cut your budget by X amount of dollars," then next thing is, "How are we going to do that?"

EN: Yes.

JR: And um. So, they turned to the Budget Director, ah, but the Budget Director [Jim Metcalf] didn't have any magical answers, but Institutional Research.

EN: This was Jim Metcalf at that time.

JR: We didn't have any magical answers either. But we had some data that might. We had some data that would help ah, in a logical way, ah, and as I say in an objective way, to make these decisions, very gross. Because we didn't have any measures of quality or any of that. We just had numbers on cost.

EN: Mhm.

JR: But still, ah, I felt very ah, strongly that, using cost numbers as a beginning in a discussion of budgets was a smart thing.

EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: What I mean by that is, filing, if a department was very, very expensive. And we, we can do internal studies that demonstrated this, you know. And, and I'll tell you some more details in a minute. But if a department comes up very expensive, at least the Vice President can sit down with the Deans and the Deans with the Chairman and say, "Look, you're very expensive."

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: "Now, why is that? Is it justified?" Because it might be. It might be a very fine department and in that case.

EN: Mhm.

JR: it may be a department that we consider better than most and in that case it's justified to have higher costs.

EN: Yes. Right.

JR: So, I never pretended to get into those parts of the argument. All I did was put up the costs. Well, if you're in a decision-making position, it is far easier to use numbers than it is to use judgment,

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Ah, [EN and JR laugh] you know, to put it as straightforwardly as I can. Ah, the, oh. So that began to happen. Therefore, there was a lot more attention paid to the Unit Cost Study and to the Comparative Cost Study. Now, as a result, I had to become more sophisticated in what I was doing in providing the numbers. And there were people absolutely. You know, there were a lot of interesting fights. There were people ah, trying to do, to demonstrate why my numbers were wrong.

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EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Why I was doing it wrong. Usually, they were people whose budget was being cut. Ah, so, I developed a way of um, showing Unit Costs or Costs per Department, using the idea of discipline from state-wide data now and level of instruction. So, as a result, when we compared, let's say, History Department, your department. When we compared History in ah, at Edwardsville, we were using costs from the Social Sciences broadly, okay.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Ah, from the State, by level, to make those comparisons. So, nobody could say, "Well, you're comparing us to something cheaper." Or, "You're comparing us to something expensive." We were saying, "You're in the Social Studies. That's not perfect. You're teaching this much lower division, upper division, Grad I, Grad II. That's not perfect either, but that is, that reflects your reality because you're competing with history departments in 11 other universities." And so, it became fairly sophisticated in that regard. Um, now it didn't begin to. It didn't begin to deal with things like fixed costs, variable costs, marginal costs.

EN: Yes.

JR: Things like that because I would have been spending all my time at a computer putting out numbers that nobody would have understood anyway. But ah, so, that's where you, what you call the Normative Costs. And then you, the Board of Higher Education was still not using ah, discipline. And ah, we were all, as all of this was happening, I was participating with institutional research people from around the State - constantly talking about, "O.K. Here's our budget. We're starting it. Here's a Cost Study. Here's what we need to do. Here's the way it's looking." They began to pick up on this, doing it by discipline and level. And they began to apply a lot more sophisticated measures against us if you will. Against is not right. To our budget so that they could make decisions.

EN: Was it your? Was it your idea to use the um? the idea of the discipline from the State data?

JR: Oh, the discipline to the.

EN: Or was that going on everywhere?

JR: Well, to use it for Edwardsville, yes.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Because I needed to get something that was ah, more discriminatory. I had to do it that way, I felt, because otherwise, ah, again using history, I would be comparing History's instructional costs.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: To Biology and Physics, and and I knew that that was not appropriate. You can't get perfect with this.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And we had been discussing this in our meetings with the Board of Higher Education, but nobody ever did much with it, and I decided, since people were relying on these numbers here, that I had to come up with something better, and I did. It, it took me several iterations to get it properly done, but ah, yeah. Now, I, as I say, shortly after that, the ah, the Board of Higher Education, because we were discussing these things, the Board of Higher Education began to ah, to use similar, to do a State-wide normative.

EN: Discipline.

JR: By discipline level. Ah, so I can't say I invented it, but I don't know and I can't tell you, and I know for sure that several other institutions were not doing it internally because politically, they couldn't get. Technically, they couldn't get the job done, and politically, apparently, people weren't ready for it. Ah, it was at. I mean it wasn't a stroke of genius on my part. But I was doing it, and Carbondale may have, but, [EN laughs] but I don't know for sure. Oh, yeah, they should have if they weren't. And I kept telling them that. Ah, because it's a great tool to start the discussion with. Ah, and I couldn't tell you if other institutions in the state were using it internally the way I was. Ah, I just don't. To this day, I don't know. Because you know, institutions have different cultures.

EN: Yeah.

JR: But, at the time, I think Earl Lazerson under. There were some people here who understood what I was trying to do, Dave Werner, Earl Lazerson understood quite well what was going on.

EN: Now, Earl Lazerson became the Provost in 1978.

JR: Yes.

EN: Was that about when you began your use of discipline?

JR: No. By that time, I was probably using discipline cost study.

EN: Okay.

JR: Yes. Ah.

EN: He was Dean of Sciences so maybe he knew about it.

JR: Well, he's a mathematician and a very bright guy. And the people in the. Most of the people in the physical sciences and in business knew exactly what was going on, ah, and of course, they could criticize it correctly, equally. Ah, but yeah, I was doing it about that time. How much he

used it, I don't know. When he was the. When Buzz [Kenneth] Shaw became President, and that's about the time the State Board really began recommending cuts for Edwardsville, and so, I had to explain how we did it to Shaw. Lazerson knew already. He and I had been, worked together. He understood it perfectly. But I had to explain it to President Shaw because he had to be able to deal with this.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Ah, at the State level. And we were really getting cut pretty consistently. Ah, by that time, I was reporting to the business, or, yeah, the Vice President for Administration, I guess, who was Ria Frijters.

EN: Yes.

JR: That was 1978 or 1979 thereabouts. And ah, the Normative Cost Study, the Comparative Cost Study, became very important in those years. Ah, then.

EN: How did you?

JR: Do you want me to keep going?

EN: Yes. Yeah, I I think this is very important to understand. No one has really ever explained this the way you explained it. I interviewed Sally Ferguson, and every time I came to one of these sorts of things. She would say, "Well, ask John Reiner." [JR and EN laugh]

JR: Sally wasn't there yet at that time. Sally would have known if she had been there because she's very bright.

EN: How do you spell Frijters name?

JR: F-R-I-J-T-E-R-S.

EN: Oh. Okay. I knew that. I put an extra E in there.

JR: His first name is Ria. R-I-A.

EN: Yeah. I knew that.

JR: Ah, we were good friends. After she left, we were good friends.

EN: She went to Mizzou.

JR: She left to go to the University of Missouri and then ended up at Wayne State University.

EN: Uh-huh.

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JR: So, the budgets. We were really taking some big-budget shocks. When [Kenneth] Shaw became President and a re-centralization process kind of clicked in. Shaw became Chancellor of the SIU System.

EN: Mhm.

JR: And of course, they searched for Presidents, and and ah, Lazerson became President of SIUE. And ah, boy I don't remember who the Academic.

EN: Um.

JR: Oh, I remember who. Did he hire?

EN: The first President was Earl Beard.

JR: Was he?

EN: Yes, Earl Beard was Earl Lazerson's first maybe "acting."

JR: Okay. Okay. But Lazerson became President. When Shaw became Chancellor. And that would have been what 1980...?

EN: 1980.

JR: Okay. Ah, at that point Lazerson reorganized the University.

EN: Mhm.

JR: And got rid of all the Vice Presidents except the Vice President of the Provost. and he established Directors. Again the reorganization here. The Directors were: Personnel, Public Affairs, and I might not have these titles right. But they'd be in the records.

EN: Uh-huh. Right. They are in the records.

JR: You can find those whenever you want. Planning and Resource Management.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Lemme think, what am I missing. Oh, and Administration. I guess. Ah, so, I came, and they were Directors, there were no Vice Presidents. These were divisions of the university. He did away with all the Vice Presidents. There was still a Dean of Students. But all, I became Director of Planning and Resource Management.

EN: Yes.

JR: Jim Buck became Planning, or director of...

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EN: Public Affairs.

JR: Public Affairs. Luther Statler became Director of ah, Administrative Affairs. I guess.

EN: Yeah, I'm going to interview him.

JR: Yeah.

EN: But. [Recording stops]

JR: And the, our biggest problems at that time were, of course, were cutting budgets. And Earl's biggest challenge was to do that, and he used ah, normative cost study data extensively to explain to the University Community what was going on.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: You know. I can remember having meetings in the auditorium in Dunham Hall, Auditorium, where there were university community meetings. And he was standing up with an overhead, showing them normative cost numbers that I was developing, that I had developed from, from State numbers. And what the problems were facing us. So it was an important, I assume it was, I know it was. A very important. Now Shaw had done the same thing incidentally before he became Chancellor. So, it was an important tool for these guys to again open up the discussion, to explain why we were doing what we were doing in the way of budget-cutting ah, and why we had to take a look at the University and try to set priorities among our programs and so forth. Now, when I became Director of Planning and Resource Management, at about that time, too, there were [JR laughs] ah, some big, big screw ups with regard to computing at Carbondale, not, not up here. We didn't have enough resources in computing at that point, but ah, our academic computing was well-done because the School of Business was running a pretty good operation. We had ah, [recording stops] a very good academic operation. Most of the.

EN: Because of the state-level consortium.

JR: Yeah. There was a state-wide consortium. Then I think might have been called the Illinois Computer Consortium or something.

EN: Something like that.

JR: And we were using online. It was the only online access anybody had around here. And, so, academic computing was being served, I think, pretty well, but administrative computing and the administrative side was in the dark ages, basically.

EN: Mhm. Now was this at our campus? Or was this at Carbondale.

JR: That was here.

EN: Okay.

JR: I mean, when I say "dark ages," that's not quite true. We didn't have anything on-line for practical purposes, a little bit. People like Sally Ferguson were able to ah, set up some online procedures, but it was very very primitive. And ah, it was further complicated by ah, so, we knew we had to do some things in the way of computing. Spend some money, a lot of money.

EN: Mhm.

JR: And about that time, there was a Computer Director at Carbondale, who bought a new computer that was basically obsolete at the time he bought it, and everybody knew it, [EN sighs] and everybody kind of knew that. It, he spent a whole bunch of money.

EN: A main frame? Is that what?

JR: It was a main frame. Yes, it was a huge, a big IBM, but it was one which was right in the background, or right in the shadows of another machine that was going to make it almost obsolete. He bought it, and I'm not sure I'm straight about this. You might be able to find some of this out from Board minutes and things. But he bought it ah, from a company. Or no, he bought it used, using an ah, an intermediary, a broker, that was I don't know who, his wife or brother-in-law, or something, a family member. And so, he spent a lot of money if I recall it was something like a million and a half. I don't know. I don't remember. But it was, but the day he bought it, it was like he was caught, used car. So, there was a lot of money changed hands. I don't know that he ever went to jail for it, but he may have. I can't remember his name. I've suppressed it. So, computing at that point, in the eyes of the Board of Trustees was very suspect. Anything we did in the way of computing was really scrutinized.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: That was the situation I confronted as ah, Director of Planning and Resource Management because Administrative Computing reported to me. Ah, we managed to work through it, to get it turned around, to get decent computing started, and by the time, ah, by 1988 or so.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Within five or six years, we were in pretty good shape. We were set to ah, to ah, really support a very good online or interactive computing environment. So, that's how, that's how that took place.

EN: I want to ask you about that. That has seemed to me, and I haven't been able to talk about that with anyone yet. That that was one of the big successes of our University, having people early on who saw the importance of the computer to the future and who saw the need to plan for it.

JR: Well, ah, yeah. Lazerson saw that ah, very clearly.

EN: Uh-huh.

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JR: I'd like to think I saw it. [EN laughs] And computing was very difficult. And people like Dave Werner saw it. Ah, computing is one of those things that's impossible to spend money and after the fact to think it was wise because it was changing so rapidly. You could spend a lot of money and not get very far.

EN: Yes, and that's what, that's the tricky part, isn't it? Planning in that environment.

JR: Yes. It is very, very difficult because tomorrow something can make everything you did today obsolete. I just mentioned the guy in Carbondale.

EN: Carbondale.

JR: And now some of that. I mean, anybody could have fallen into that trap.

EN: Yes.

JR: But in his case, he was using relatives, you know somebody as intermediates. And that really got him. I think he might have gone to jail. I mean I don't know. I think he did. I think if he didn't go to jail, he was certainly ah, in legal trouble.

EN: Yes.

JR: Um, but yeah, I mean, the kinds of things we did early in Earl's presidency and when I was Director is to try to get the current system straightened up, get enough computing to run them and then, to set up a basis on which we could begin to build for the future.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Then, in 1988, I guess, Earl again reorganized and set up Vice Presidents. Ah, [Benjamin] Quillian was the Vice President for Administration; [James] Buck was the Vice President for ah, Development.

EN: Mhm.

JR: And I think Barbara Teeters was Provost.

EN: I actually, Barbara Teeters was Provost from '81 to '86. She left in July '86 and then David Werner.

JR: Ah. Okay.

EN: He was Provost at this time.

JR: Yeah, so the Director. Okay. Okay. The Direc, by that time she had been long gone. What am I talking about? The Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost was Barbara Teeters,

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and then Dave Werner. That had been the only leftover Vice Presidency. By '88, he did away with the Director thing.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: I think it was '88.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Um, and Buck became...

EN: Development.

JR: Development. I became, ah, I was neither interested nor considered for the Vice President [EN laughs] of Business Affairs or Administration, so I became an Assistant Vice President.

EN: Under Ben Quillian.

JR: To Quillian for Planning and Resource Management. I think Marsha Puro was hired as Assistant Vice President for Personnel.

EN: Yeah.

JR: At that time. And ah, I think that's probably.

EN: Then, Constance Rockingham was Vice President for Student Affairs.

JR: Vice President of Student Affairs, yeah. Yes, right. Right.

EN: This is really great [EN laughs]

JR: I'm glad it's helpful.

EN: Really great. This is really great.

JR: I hope it's helpful.

EN: So, then you became the, so Planning and Resource management. So did you work with the UPBC [University Planning and Budget Council]?

JR: Yes. At the time, I was Assistant Vice President for Planning and Resource Management. Actually, long before that, I was Director of Planning and Resource Management. Um, I was always the liaison from Earl [Lazerson] I was Earl's, he expected me to sit on the, I was the administrative...

EN: Liaison.

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JR: I think I might have even been an ex officio.

EN: Yeah. ex officio member.

JR: Of ah, of that, of the UPBC and maybe three, two or three other committees. [EN laughs] Committees all over the place.

EN: Uh-huh. Right.

JR: Ah, and that continued, mainly because they were also relying greatly on numbers and the kinds of things that Institutional Research was doing. Ah, they needed somebody that could explain budget processes to them. We had a budget process called RAMP [Resource Allocation and Management Program]

EN: Resource Allocation and Management Plan.

JR: Management Program.

EN: Oh, okay.

JR: And I, I I knew more than I wanted to even think about about that also. And so, ah, I was serving as Earl's ex officio member, and whenever I you know, for instance the Committee met, I would come back, I would take minutes and send him a memo telling him what we talked about.

EN: Oh, that's interesting you took minutes.

JR: Yeah, I didn't take the minutes for the meeting. I took my own minutes.

EN: Oh, okay.

JR: Forgive me, notes, they aren't minutes, they were notes. And then I would send him a report as soon as I could about what was going on and what I thought probably the committee needed to function properly.

EN: Oh, oh, okay now this. I I want to ask several things here.

JR: Sure.

EN: First of all, UPBC came out of an [Illinois] BHE initiative in about '82. They, they said universities had to have a global planning process. No? That's wrong?

JR: If that's correct, I never heard of it.

EN: Oh, okay.

JR: But, I mean, it's possible see.

EN: And then RAMP [Resource Allocation and Management Planning] was part of that.

JR: No. No.

EN: No? When did RAMP start?

JR: RAMP started back in ah probably mid-to-late 70s.

EN: And were you...?

JR: Andy Kochman was still Vice President.

EN: Okay.

JR: Ah, it was right before Buzz Shaw.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Ah, Kochman was Pres, Vice President, because I remember that a whole bunch of us had to go up to a class right outside of the University of Illinois. What's the name of it? They have kind of a retreat house sort-of-place.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: We had a great big State-wide meeting up there on RAMP.

EN: Okay.

JR: That's when it started. Um, I think probably it would be safe to say that Shaw started UPBC, but I don't know that.

EN: Okay. I thought it started under President Lazerson, but I could be wrong.

JR: It could be that too. I I, at that point, I was not deeply involved member.

EN: Right.

JR: I was Director of Institutional Research.

EN: Right.

JR: And until I became, became until I reported directly to Lazerson, I knew vaguely what was going on, but I didn't have all that much direct responsibility.

EN: Now then, this is another thing I was gonna ask you about then.

JR: Sure.

EN: I talked to...

JR: Well, lemme lemme finish, um, I'm sorry.

EN: No. No, that's okay.

JR: But the UPBC, I am virtually certain, didn't become, didn't come into existence because the Board of Higher Education had anything to say about it directly.

EN: Okay.

JR: They didn't tell the University they had to have a UPBC. I think the UPBC was put into place with the recognition that we needed a university-wide ah, council to insure input. Especially from faculty, but also from other constituencies. I could not, maybe someone can. But I could not draw for you a line between the Board of Higher Education and the UPBC.

EN: Okay.

JR: Except that we used their data a lot.

EN: Okay.

JR: And we had to discuss what they were saying a lot.

EN: Okay. Then the other thing, I get, because you retired in 1993 before Earl Lazerson left.

JR: Yeah, he left six or eight months later.

EN: Yeah, but but what I, I interviewed Marsha Puro and Dan Corbett, and I got two different views of UPBC.

JR: Oh, really. Of UPBC?

EN: Yeah. of U. Because Marsha Puro said, "Yes. We set the priorities," and Dan Corbett said, "Really, under Earl Lazerson, he, he felt that he needed to set the priorities." And that it didn't become a fully, a full priority setting agency with full information until Nancy Belck and David Werner. Now those are kinda two different.

JR: That's interesting. I think what you're talking about here. Now, in a way, I would have to agree with Dan on this. Um, the, Lazerson would certainly listen. If UPBC came back with priorities.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Lazerson would certainly try to follow them, but if they conflicted with ah.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Things that he felt, or if they were in conflict or he felt were probably in the best interest of the University, he would follow his own ah, judgment. I don't think that's much different from any other university President. I mean.

EN: No.

JR: I I mean, that's the way government works. Because the people on the UPBC did not have, they were not privy to all the information that they needed to make these decisions.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Most of it I would say that nobody was hiding anything from them, but you know, ultimately the president has to make that decision

EN: Okay.

JR: And I would say I would, that undoubtedly UPBC was very important they did set the priorities so what was put before Lazerson was, "Look, here's the way we think things ought to go." And then, he would take that into consideration, and generally speaking, his decisions followed that.

EN: Okay.

JR: But, basically, he was a very good president because he would make his decisions based on that. I would be very surprised if Belck and Werner did it any other way.

EN: Okay.

JR: I didn't work for either one of them.

EN: I know.

JR: But I know Dave very well. I didn't know Nancy at all. Ah, I know Dave Werner very well he was a long term you know Dean.

EN: Yes.

JR: And, but any president cannot go to any committee of any kind and say, "Tell us what to do. You set the direction."

EN: Yes.

JR: Sure, "You give a sense to me of what the university community wants to go and how you, especially how to get it done." And priorities were set. So, I think UPBC were very important in the priority-setting scheme of things, but ultimately, the President made the decisions.

EN: Okay.

JR: I hope that doesn't

EN: Yes. No. That's good. Well, that gives me an idea of how to talk about it. You'll get credited.

JR: You think about it as governance. It's a governance question.

EN: Yes. Mhm.

JR: I think both Dan and Marsha were right. Although, Marsha was right that the UPBC you know set priorities and communicated those to Lazerson. But they didn't drive him. They were part of his world, the world that he tried to reflect in his decisions. And Dan was correct that Earl tended to, he didn't ignore them. Earl tended to take things into consideration, but he was, he was under, he had a very clear view for the university.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: So, both of them are right, but they may have overstated their cases a little bit.

EN: Okay.

JR: Something in-between if you will.

EN: Yeah, sure.

JR: So then, I was Assistant Vice President under Quillian for what, five years until I retired, five years, yeah. And computing was ah, placed directly under him. We had by that time, we had introduced pretty much, there was interactive computing around.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: We had introduced two or three new administrative computing systems that were still largely mainframe based. Course that was before the technology, the technology really was changing rapidly in those years. Uh, then he got Computing reporting directly to him.

EN: Now um, do you know anything about. Maybe this started maybe this was a bigger problem after you left, but there was, there was an issue between Administrative Computing and Academic Computing. That eventually Jay Starett was brought in. I'm gonna interview him.

JR: That was after I left.

EN: Okay that was after you. But were the roots?

JR: I could tell you that ah this Illinois Computer Consortium [ICC] that I was telling you about.

EN: Yes.

JR: Was strictly Academic Computing. And it was done very well because it used Control Data Corporation C-D-C equipment, which was in the forefront nationwide of interactive computing and big computing. Ah, super computers you heard about in those days were CDC computers, and Illinois Computer, the ICC, Illinois Computer Consortium used CDC equipment. As we had, as it happened, turns out it was housed here at Edwardsville.

EN: It was! The whole thing was housed here?

JR: Yes.

EN: Now I never understood that.

JR: The computer was here, all the, all the equipment with this, the big mainframe computing was at Edwardsville.

EN: Where was it?

JR: In a direct...what? Where?

EN: Yeah, in the basement of Communications [Communications Building is now known as Dunham Hall]. Is that where it was?

JR: It was down. It was in a room, I think it was in the same room probably as ah, our IBM equipment.

EN: Oh.

JR: And it had its own Director, guys name was Dick Guffy. I think he was Executive Director; well he was the Operational Director.

EN: G-U-F-F-E-Y?

JR: G-U-F-F-Y. Again, you can check that.

EN: Okay, check that.

JR: He, he around for a long time. he was a Geography instructor, Assistant Professor also.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: But ah, that served for a long time. And then we were beginning to, this was while I was Director of Planning and Resource Management, we were beginning to build our capacity with our IBM mainframe and our interactive ah, capabilities. We were beginning to get to the, we got to the place where we really didn't need Illinois Computer Consortium.

EN: Um-hmm.

JR: And so, we ah, we exercised an option to withdraw from the ICC, [EN sighs] and we used that money, because it was pretty expensive.
EN: Yes.

JR: I cannot quote the dollars to you, but.

EN: Oh, can you not tell me how much it...?

JR: I just don't know.

EN: You don't know. Okay.

JR: I don't know.
EN: I can probably call Dan [Corbett] and ask him. Maybe.

JR: Boy that, yeah, he might be able to go back and find something. How much we were spending with Illinois Computer Consortium.

EN: Okay. Just generally it was expensive.

JR: It was, it was a pretty good chunk of money and and so we took that money and we allocated it to the School of Business. You know, the academic computing laboratories got some. We used a good deal of it in our central computing facilities to provide capacity for interactive computing to our mainframe. In other words, we took that money, It still stayed in computing, but it was no longer in the State Consortium. It was with our own computing systems.

EN: Well when we withdrew did it [ICC] fold?

JR: Yeah, everybody.

EN: Okay. Everybody.

JR: I don't know how long it lasted after that, but that was pretty much the end of it. Because we were, excuse me, I can remember the meeting when I told them [the ICC] we were going to do this. And it was a, it wasn't a very pleasant meeting.

EN: No.

JR: But, you know. It really. I think a lot of people were really. See what was happening is computing was getting to the place where memory was becoming relatively inexpensive. Ah, the equipment and ah, when I say "memory," I'm talking about both read back memory and read-only memory, all kinds of memory was becoming inexpensive. Speeds were picking up. Interactive computing was becoming available everywhere. CDC was getting whooped-up by IBM. IBM was way out in front of them. PCs were coming into the picture as a matter of fact. And so, the whole environment was changing and the ah, and the structure of the Illinois Computer Consortium was just not necessary.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: People were finding other ways to serve the same needs. I don't think there was any rancor involved. But ah, it was difficult to keep the Consortium, a statewide consortium running when U of I wasn't in it. Just to keep a statewide Consortium running with all the really, really different institutions, so it wasn't really easy at all. It just became obvious. And I think we were, I'm sure we were the first ones to withdraw.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Yeah.

EN: And that just kind of got the ball rolling, and within a year or two, it was gone.

EN: And so, you said it was expensive. Were we, were we in charge of maintaining it? Since it was?

JR: [Crosstalk] No.

EN: No?

JR: No. No. Everybody.

EN: ICC sent.

JR: All the institutions contributed to the budget.

EN: Okay.

JR: To the to the Illinois Computer Consortium was a legal entity.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Um, it was a Consortium of Illinois public universities. It might have even been five of us involved. I don't know. Anyway, all of us contributed to the budget of this organization. We housed them here, and that was part of our contribution.

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EN: Okay.

JR: Ah, power, air-conditioning, ah, space. That was part of our contribution to the Consortium. But we also ah, put quite a lot of money into it. Everybody did. Because the University of Illinois remember, the University of Illinois at the time and maybe still. Illinois at that time was probably *the* premier institution in the country, outside of MIT and Cal Tech, for computing. I mean U of I was big-time computing, supercomputers. You know the movie 20-01.

EN: Yes *2001* [*A Space Odyssey].*

JR: Hal?

EN: Yeah, Hal. Remember him. Well Hal was built in the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. [EN laughs] If you see that movie, you'll hear it mentioned. He was built in Urbana. They had a, they were very very powerful in computers. They didn't need the Illinois Computer Consortium.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: But ah, it was felt that the Consortium was a way to pool money and get the necessary interactive computing out there to everybody that needed it.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And that need went away. Because things got. You could provide it for less money. What's done now on a desktop, that took enormous machines.

EN: Yes.

JR: Then if you compare that to 1961, to the first computer I ever saw it was a dinky little thing that took up a space. It was huge. It had an IBM Selective Typewriter for the output. Ah, ah, so, things were changing. Computing things change rapidly all the time.

EN: Yes.

JR: So that's really the background of that. That's how that went. It was fun! It was contentious and stressful, but it was fun.

EN: So how did you keep up with the change? Just ah when you were planning for this? Did you read *The Wall Street Journal*? Did you read *PC Week*? Was that around or?

JR: Well *PC Week* was incredibly useful but I I tried to read as much as I could in things like *The Wall Street Journal*. There were *Computer World,* other computer publications, that I tried to keep track of, but I think more than anything else I relied on people I knew that were on top of it. There were some people in Computer Science. There were some people in the School of

Business. That really knew what was going on, particularly in Computer Science. The, there were trade publications, if you will, and of course, the Director of the Computing Center, who reported to me. I had, I relied...

EN: [Dick] Guffy.

JR: ...very strongly. No. Guffy was the ICC.

EN: Okay.

JR: The Illinois Computer Consortium Director. The Director of the computing center at that time, hmn who was it. How quickly we forget, oh what's his name.

EN: Oh boy. [EN laughs]

JR: I remember the Director.

EN: That's alright I'm just interested in where.

JR: Yeah, the Director of the Computing Center I relied on very heavily for his technical expertise.

EN: Uh-huh, okay.

JR: And then, IBM itself and other vendors. IBM used to irritate me somewhat because they, they were what I would just, considered condescending. They would never hesitate to go around me to the President.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Or to the Board of Trustees when the President didn't bark the way they wanted him to. I mean, these guys - IBM played hard-ball. And I, we were an IBM shop. We tried to keep our equipment.

EN: Yes.

JR: As IBM. Not. It was very good equipment, still is very good equipment.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: So, ah, yeah. I talked to people, it's the same way you do anywhere else. You talk to people, you read as much as you can about it, tried to get a sense of what was going on. And oh yeah, at that time also. I'm trying to think. When did the? See [Kenneth] Shaw Left and Pettit, Larry Pettit came in as President [he was Chancellor] of the University.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And made a big. Made a big push to centralize decision-making in computing. And ah, that was a, that was a mess.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: They were coming up with ideas that we had done and forgotten two years earlier. It was just, they wanted to centralize everything. So, we came up with a long-range plan. We already had planned before that, but we were coming up with long-range plans in the format that the SIU central administration wanted. and they were were not bad, really. They were not bad. The planning wasn't bad, but how it was executed was not up to us. And ah, the President's Office [Chancellor's Office] under Pettit they really, they were trying to centralize a lot of power. They really wanted to make the decisions.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And everything we did in a major way had to go through them. It became a kind of a pain in the ass.

EN: Uh-huh [EN laughs] yeah. And then exacerbated later by Ted Sanders. He was the same kind of.

JR: I don't know him.

EN: So not that.

JR: Now Pettit was a, Pettit was a piece of work.

EN: Okay.

JR: If you knew him, and I don't know if you ever saw him.

EN: No.

JR: I nicknamed him, and I came up with this and I think, I'll take credit for this. I always thought he looked like Rocky the Flying Squirrel [EN laughs] in the Bullwinkle Cartoon. But ah, so, it became pretty bureaucratized in those years. We managed to keep going and did everything and then, about the time I was leaving [1993], I, well we, I didn't have anything to do with it at that time. But ah, the computing people, we had just started planning for high speed net on campus, ah, the fiber-optic network on campus. We had proceeded with the planning for that, just had begun. And then they put it in and started it under Reid Chrisenberry. Ah, there were some mistakes made. One of the best one's was, Reid really was an IBMer. I mean he really loved IBM. And ah, IBM had a, remember PCs were beginning to come in too, and PCs were ah, used, as they are now. They were networked. And ah, he insisted on standardization of the IBM operating system. People really don't understand this too well, but there was a time when Microsoft Windows was in direct competition with IBM. Well, IBM, I should say IBM was in direct competition with them. With an IBM system called OS2.

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EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Which was very very similar actually. And Chrisenberry standardized for our PC operation, all our PCs insisted that OS2 be the operating system and be based in the administrative side, and then said he wouldn't support what was everywhere else and that that would be a quick way to get people to go to OS2. Well, that was a complete bust. Because it wasn't long before OS2 wasn't, nobody was buying it. And Microsoft really ran the operating system for PCs.

EN: Uh-huh. And then there had to be a re-tooling.

JR: Not really, it was software.

EN: Oh. Okay.

JR: It was not that big of a deal.

EN: Okay.

JR: But what happened is, if you try to impose too much uniformity on a couple thousand, you know hundreds of users around campus that have their own PCs and buy their own PCs here and there, and you try to impose too much uniformity on them, you got a problem.

EN: So, that was the origin then. To get back to the original question of that was kind of the origin of, of a kind of problem between academic and administrative computing.

JR: Well that may be. Again, I didn't right before, right before I left, first of all, I can tell you that I resigned. I'm sure Marsha Puro has already told you that she resigned because Quillian was fundamentally ah, had no principles. He was a very unprincipled person.

EN: Oh, really.

JR: In my judgement, I mean he just, he was doing things that were completely unprincipled. Ah, now we were moving ahead in computing because once you get these things rolling, they don't stop, not for a while anyway. They have their own momentum. But, right before I left, I had been, it had been talked about a little bit, about putting both academic computing and administrative computing under one manager, one director, one even a Vice President was talked about at one time. Not much because nobody wanted another Vice President. Least of all me. [EN laughs] It's all about money Ellen.

EN: I think Jay Starett is that now?

JR: Yes he is.

EN: Dean of Instructional Technology or something like that, or as a Vice Chancellor.

JR: It wasn't long after I retired that I think he's a Vice Chancellor for for academic, for whatever they call it, but it is over both administrative and academic computing which it should be. Now the goals are much different. And in many ways the technologies are different for the two.

EN: That, that's interesting.

JR: The needs, in both hardware and software needs, of academic and and uh, academic has a lot of uh, very specialized software and hardware needs that administrative computing never runs into. Now there's other, everybody is running PCs, and that's common to everybody, but on the academic side, especially in the Sciences, you get a lot of needs that are highly specialized. And so they are different. When you come down to this, probably, up until the time when Jay Starett became, ah, when Dave Werner you'll notice was the Provost when this became.

EN: He's President.

JR: Was he President when we centralized, when we centralized under Jay Starett?

EN: Yes.

JR: Okay.

EN: I think he was.

JR: Um, up until then Werner, this whole thing had to do with how much money was being spent and who controlled it.

EN: Yeah.

JR: And nobody on the academic side wanted to give up money to the administrative side.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And they'd say a whole lot of different reasons it, first of all and, most of that I would agree with. Because it removed a lot of the decision making from the academic side of the university that should not have been removed.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: I'm wondering how all that money at the School of Business. But once he, he [David Werner] understood very clearly ah, that, by the ah, by the early-'90s, mid-90s, that the kind of technological changes that were taking place made the differences between administrative and academic computing much less important than it was prior to that. And and so, he made that move, which I think was a terrific move. He saved money, but again, the technology allowed it.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Uh, prior to that there were just too many different businesses involved.

EN: Yeah [JR coughs]. That's really a nice explanation of something I have wondered about.

JR: Okay, yeah I'm glad to hear that. [JR coughs] That's the way I see it, I think it's just a smart thing from what I can tell, but I'm far removed. I don't know what more I can. But my hope is that what we did in the late-'80s, early-'90s, but late-'80s especially from the time when Lazerson became President and there was the big screw up in computing at Carbondale between that and about 1988 or '90 I'm hoping we laid a good strong foundation. And I think probably we did.

EN: Mhm.

JR: But it's constant. The change is just constant in computers. It is the biggest headache on the face of the Earth.

EN: Uh-huh. Yeah.

JR: So, I'm 1990. I'm looking at this now. About the one, "What do you regard as some of the turning points?"

EN: Yeah, turning points.

JR: Well, certainly, by far the biggest one was Delyte Morris, his demise.

EN: Okay.

JR: After that, Rendleman's death. Rendleman was a very, very powerful man in the State, a powerful Democrat.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And my guess is that, that had he lived, and it wasn't only his wife. But I mean he, he may have been the most powerful Democrat. Certainly, I know he was *the* most powerful in Southern Illinois and probably one of the most powerful in the whole State, he would have been a formidable.

EN: Governor.

JR: Gubernatorial candidate, but he found a million dollars, you know that story.

EN: Oh, yes.

JR: Okay. You've heard about that.

EN: There's a pretty good academic article about it. That doesn't come to any conclusions but does the chronology.

JR: The story is interesting. The the ah, Paul Powell died, Rendlemen was his executor.

EN: Yes.

JR: And, and really things were going pretty well. Now politicians were after Rendlemen because I've got, he was a very interesting guy. Now the Paul Powell affair, back to that. He was the executor of the estate, so he went up to Springfield. Paul Powell was not married. Ah, he had an apartment in Springfield. And when he died Rendlemen went up there and parked and went up to start going through his stores and he found a million dollars in shoeboxes.

EN: Mhm.

JR: And I don't know if it was one closet, it must have been a big closet, because a million dollars [EN laughs] was a lot. And he told, he tells this story, now he'd be al little bit high when he told it so, and he really enjoyed telling stories. [EN laughs] He took all the money. He had a University car.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: A Lincoln. It was a Lincoln Continental, a huge car. Trunk seven or eight of us could be in. He'd put all the money in there, and he'd made one last trip back up to Paul Powell's apartment, came back to his car, and it had been towed! [EN laughs] He loves to tell the story, well nobody looked in the trunk. it was just towed away. He got the car back, and the money was still there. But then what happened is, this all took place just before the General Election, whatever year that was. I don't remember what year that was. But it was right before the general election and he did not tell anybody that he had found this money until the election, til after the General Election.

EN: Yes.

JR: And that was, it was actually you know, ah, I don't remember all the claims and counterclaims and legalities at the time. but I think probably, if it weren't for that, he probably would have a run for Governor.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Rut I think that was the end of him politically.

EN: Right.

JR: He also, we were in trouble because of the Mississippi River Festival, and the way it was funded earlier. And he was in. They actually, they, they, the Legislature actually had open hearings. Had committee hearings down here on the stage of Dunham Hall about the Mississippi River Festival, great big hearings. They wanted to embarrass Rendlemen as much as anything.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: About the way it was funded, and so forth.

EN: How was it funded?

JR: It was funded of course, they they had ah, they had ah.

EN: They tried to fund it with gate receipts but the university had some, some part of the budget.

JR: Well, you'd be, it would be very very difficult for you to find State money directly budgeted to it.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: In fact probably impossible. There might have been some, not much.

EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: Ah.

EN: There was a fund, community fundraising thing.

JR: Oh, there was that, they had, they had, they had money coming in from ah, you know, admissions. From people buying tickets. But what the State was interested in was the role of the Physical Plant. See you know, what a lot of people don't understand, and I'm not sure how much of this you wanna put in there.

EN: Well Steve Kerber, who is a very good historian of Illinois and the University is making his contribution to the 50th is a big CD about the MRF [Mississippi River Festival] I'm going kinda lightly on it in my work.

JR: Oh, okay.

EN: But I will say things about the finance.

JR: Well, I can tell, and again this is sort of, the way that the hearings held on the, on the accusation to any university that we were putting a lot of state money into it indirectly.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Through the Physical Plant operation. You know. It was true.

EN: Yeah.

JR: It was true. Ah, it was not supposed to be that way. State money was not. Maybe you've heard all this before.

EN: No. I haven't.

JR: But ah, we were providing a lot of Physical Plant services, maintenance, ah, oh all sorts of maintenance.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Utilities, any number of things, through our Physical Plant system and ah, it was pretty hard to track. Let's put it that way. [EN laughs] Nobody was, nobody was stealing money, mind you.

EN: Yes.

JR: I'm not. I would never suggest that, as far as I know that never happened. But I do know that the University was subsidizing MRF significantly via the Physical Plant. Now that's one I'm not sure I would want anybody to know I told you.

EN: Okay.

JR: Because you may not have heard it, although you might have. From other people. But I know for a fact. And then, there were hearings, and of course this became public. There were hearings on it. Jim Metcalf was the one who...

EN: Yes.

JR: ...master-minded the financing of it. There were public hearings on it as I say. Much of it was aimed against Rendleman. Because it was happening when it wasn't supposed to happen and it was politically aimed.

EN: Uh-huh. I saw how the Governor kinda let go of him after that.

JR: Oh yeah, he lost a lot of. You mean after the MRF thing.

EN: No, I mean after the Paul Powell.

JR: Oh, yeah. Oh, there were accusations you know. I don't know what attorney, what executor there's certain things you're supposed to do immediately. Like if he found all that money, I think he was.

EN: Oh, he did everything correctly. He went to. He got the president of the most conservative bank in Springfield and the most conservative Democratic lawyer and he went to the bank President's house that night. And he opened up the vault. The President came down with the key and opened it for all the money. And they reported it for the IRS perfectly on time. Ah.

JR: So, all that.

EN: All of that was on the up and up. I thought, I'm gonna publish a...lemme turn this [Recording stops]

JR: He was a wonderful politician.

EN: Yeah.

JR: One of my favorite things about him. I used to have to come into his office to brief him on some things from time to time. I was not in a position where I was doing too much that was of interest to him.

EN: Well.

JR: But once in a while, he was interested. I remember one day, I came in, and he was sitting in the President's corner, and he had this huge box, oak box, open with index cards, big index cards. I don't know how big they were, but he had these out in front of him and he had a number of index cards on his desk, and each of these index cards had a picture. Every faculty member had his photograph and information about him. And, he said, "I bet you're wondering what I'm doing?" Kind of ah, talking, and I said, "Yeah what are you doing?" And he said, He would go through those boxes of faculty members of their pictures. He knew their names, their wives names, husbands, spouses' names, childrens names. He knew where they went to school. He knew everything about them. Okay. So, he'd stand in a reception line, you know.

EN: Yeah.

JR: You know, and I said, "By God why are you doing that." He says, "Well, there was a time when I thought I might get into politics." [EN laughs] Ah, the, but I mean, he was good. He was really, really good.

EN: That's a great story.

JR: Now, his management style was basically throw a hamburger out and see who got the biggest chunk. [EN laughs] That's the way, that's the way I saw his management style. That's probably an over-exaggeration. So, the turning point was certainly the ah, ah, Morris' demise, the decentralization of the University right after that, and Rendleman's period because right about then the budget became a serious issue. Ah, the next big turning point probably was that transition period. And when [Kenneth] Shaw became President here. This was a big deal, and then, the recentralization when Shaw became Chancellor. Probably the biggest ah, changes, the biggest ah, impact on the University came under [Earl] Lazerson. Because most people, most people don't understand, but I probably understand that part of it too, I gotta be honest because I worked for him, how much money we had to cut during the first years of Earl's presidency. Also, I don't think people appreciate that nobody was fired. Nobody lost their jobs. I don't even know if any programs were discontinued. There were priorities. The University Planning and Budget Council [UPBC] was set up. He, and I mentioned that they didn't call the shots, but he really did involve the community, and most people don't appreciate that.

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EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: They also, and so his biggest task was to try to get the academic house in order. Ah, with regard to dollars, where the money was going, to pay attention to excellence. I really believe that that was his biggest contribution. Then, as far as the welfare of the University, nobody really appreciates how much he gave up. You know, he he they tried to close the Dental School during his presidency. He saved the Dental School. And he did it by agreeing with the Board of Higher Education. The Dental School had this big, huge new campus planned out on, ah, where University Park is right now.

EN: Oh, I see.

JR: And ah, the Board of Higher Education wasn't about to fund it. [paper and rustling noises] And ah, they finally got down to the point where ah, Lazerson agreed that, if they built a new clinic [in Alton], which was sorely needed. The Dental School needed a new clinic. Then he would not. If he agreed that to ah, just build a new clinic they would continue the Dental School. They would not discontinue the Dental School. That was at a time when Dental Schools all over the country were closing like mad. And ah, so I mean he saved the Dental School, literally, I think. He also, he he did some things for Governors that were unpleasant things. He served, ah, I think, chaired the first committee on the bridge over the Mississippi River, the new bridge that is still in planning. But he first, Chaired the first committee that began to do the planning and the preliminary work for that, took it down quite a ways. He chaired the committee that ran East St. Louis, for a while. Um, those things indebted the State to him.

EN: Mhm.

JR: Oh, also, I should say that the School of Engineering became a School of Engineering.

EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: We got an Engineering Building. We got a Fine Arts Building. We got a, a, an addition to the Communications Building. We vacated ah, Wagner.

EN: Yes.

JR: I mean an enormous number of very necessary and important changes took place under him. Um and that really, that brings me up to 1993. That's where I stop with the people, but, and the turning points. He he [Earl Lazerson] was definitely a turning point. Ah, role of leadership. Well, ah, Rendleman was a very strong leader, exceptionally political, internally very popular with a lot of people. He didn't really, he was not an academic at all. He just really wasn't, and he knew it. He would tell everybody that. So, on the academic side, I think the Provost really ran things.

EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: The Vice President.

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EN: Kochman.

JR: That was [Andrew] Kochman, and Kochman wasn't all that [EN coughs] strong an individual, I didn't think. Andy wasn't very strong at all. He was a very nice man, but he wasn't very strong. Ah, but, Rendleman did well for the U. We got a lot of money during those years, and but it was beginning. The writing was beginning on the wall that it was going to go away. [Kenneth] Shaw came and kind of put things back together again after Rend. Rendleman's style was a very loose one, and I say, throw the hamburger out.

EN: Yes.

JR: See who gets this chunk that chunk and Shaw tried to make, ah, tried to make some sense out of all this. Also, Rendleman, right before he died, had fired ah, the ah, I think the Vice President for Student Affairs, the Vice President for Business Affairs, and an Assistant to the Vice President. He fired a number of people. I don't remember why or anything like that. Bill Hudgens, Arnold Franke. Those guys lost their jobs. Rendleman was ready to reorganize, I guess.

EN: Yes. He wanted a Vice President for Administration.

JR: Did he?

EN: Yes, that was.

JR: I was in no position to know anything, much anyway.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: But, then Shaw was a transition. He tried to put it all back together, to reorganize in a way that would forward the University, and then, the big transition was, is when he became President [Chancellor], or he became Chancellor, then Lazerson became President. And again, we had a re-centralization to some degree, not a great deal, and that was important because Shaw was a very good voice for the University. That reminds me. There are those who really want a separate Board of Trustees for SIU Edwardsville.

EN: Yes. Good.

JR: Ah, those who want that do not seem to understand. All we have to do is look at University of Illinois and the power it has in this State. To understand that it pays to have a System of good universities. You're gonna be stronger in a system situation than you are separately.

EN: Uh-huh. Right.

JR: All we have to do is look around the State. Some of the things that have happened since ah, everybody got their own Board of Trustees might look like theirs progress. But all it's done is screwed things up. But the Regents and the Governors' people...systems were far stronger as

systems than they are as individual institutions, and SIU System is much stronger than it would ever be as SIUE and SIU Carbondale separately. They, it just would make no sense to have a separate Board to Trustees to me. People who want that, don't seem to understand how power resides.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: If you have a good President.

EN: Right.

JR: An external if you will, a man who can really present both Universities' case to the world. Much better than having two, because immediately you're going to have bureaucracy and you're going to dilute the power.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Immediately, and you're gonna, you're gonna, ah, dilute the power. And you don't want to dilute the power. Because there is a State power structure still.

EN: I'll just turn [Recording stops]

JR: Well here, we'll give you this. But we're not gonna give you operating funds because we don't have the money. So you don't. When you don't get an incremental amount of money into your budget to do that, you've gotta find it somewhere else. You have to re-allocate.

EN: That's right.

JR: And it's gotta be done.

EN: Yeah.

JR: All you've gotta do is own your own home to understand that.

EN: Yes [EN laughs].

JR: Ah, People. Politics. Politics. The buildings. Ah, yeah, the the ah, the only.

EN: Do we?

JR: Well I already told you the story. People I mentioned [Ben] Quillian.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Ah, I didn't have much use for Quillian, mainly simply, he was an unprincipled person. He did a lot of things that I don't think I want to go into.

EN: Mm-hmm.

JR: Ah, but ah, really, really, bothered me. Let's put it that way. And when I, when I retired, I told Earl [Lazerson] about it. So Earl knew about it. And I think, frankly, that Earl knew in the case of Quillian. And I can't complain too much. Because before he was hired, ah, Earl and I went out to lunch, and he asked me what I thought, and I said, "I think he's growing," and and so I had my opportunity to tell him, "No."

EN: Yes. Uh-huh, right.

JR: And I didn't. I said, "Oh, I think he's growing." I think Earl probably was doing the wrong thing for the right reasons. Or the wrong thing for the right reasons. Which, I'm sorry that's backward. Because ah, he was strongly devoted to the idea of diversity, of giving our black faculty and administrators ah, career paths. In the case of Ben Quillian, I think it was misplaced, but others may disagree. He was slick.

EN: Yeah [JR laughs].

JR: The as far as stories. I'll tell you, well, ah. I will tell you one story about buildings.

EN: Yes.

JR: In about 1970 I suppose, I was very young, and about 30, and there were Buildings II and III [Alumni and Founders]. That are now all, I don't know what all they are now. That's one thing Sanders I guess named all the buildings, that's quite an achievement [EN and JR laugh]. The the ah.

EN: Yeah. Nancy Belck wanted to name them after people.

JR: I think that would have been nice.

EN: She actually did recommend I think naming one after Mother Jones. Who is a...

JR: Oh, they are there. The mining. The coal mining?

EN: Yeah. Uh-huh.

JR: That would have been good.

EN: That would have been nice. For Southern Illinois.

JR: For Southern Illinois. Yeah.

EN: Yeah. But.

JR: Ah, we were ah, those two buildings were on the drawing boards, and proposed.

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EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And in for budget approval at the State level. And ah, I was doing space use utilization studies. Mainly the only one because nobody else knew how to do this stuff.

EN: Yes.

JR: Nobody was crunching the numbers.

EN: That's where you're in the records everywhere.

JR: Just all these. Oh, really? I didn't know that.

EN: Yes.

JR: All these numbers, people didn't know how to deal with them, and ah, so we could demonstrate that we needed space for our students.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: We could demonstrate without a doubt using State-wide figures and our own. So Bill Hudgens was the Vice President for Business Affairs I think at that time and they were in charge of all capital development and physical plant and so forth. And he called me and said, let's go up, "We have a meeting in Springfield with the Capital Development Board." And, ah, "This is a final meeting to see whether we're going to get our buildings funded for next year." Or whenever it was. "And we'd like you to come along and talk about space needs." And I did. I ah, they asked me to talk about it, and I said, "Here's the numbers, and here's why. Here's the kind of things we just don't have the space and we've got all these students." And, he wasn't, it wasn't quite that information. I don't know what I quite said at the time. The guy who we were talking to, is now a guy who is now Vice President for Administration or something such at the University of Illinois, Craig, I forget his name.

EN: Is now?

JR: Oh yeah. He has been for quite awhile. I mean, a really really bright guy, and was really pretty tough, but what is fixed in my mind is that about half way through the meeting, in walked Sam Vadalabene. [EN and JR both laugh] And ah, Sam sat across from him. Craig was working for the Capital Development Board at that time. And he's now with the University of Illinois. But he was a strong man, and bright, and ah, but Sam sat across from him. And ah, he wasn't pounding the table, but he was, he made the point that we needed these buildings and expected some action [EN laughs] you know that sort of thing. That was a wonderful, that was a wonderful experience for me to see things happening at that level. Vadalabene was a very, very powerful man.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Um, stories. I'll tell you somebody who you might be able to find some of these. Try to find the minutes of the ah, ah, Physical Facilities Committee very early on when they were building the new buildings on this campus.

EN: Okay.

JR: John Richardson was the Secretary.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And he wrote minutes that are masterpieces of humor. [EN laughs] They are wonderful minutes. It, I'm sure they're available.

EN: I think I've seen them. Saw them in the file.

JR: They are hysterical. Ah.

EN: And I could, I could have Amanda pull some and Xerox em for me.

JR: And he, he of course, talking to John Richardson sometimes reminded me of talking to a Great Book.[EN laughs] He was really a bright guy, really a bright guy, and could write, could speak, he just really had a lot going for him. And these minutes are very enlightening if you want to take a look on how some of the discussions on some of the early part of the Physical Plan of this university. How they, how, it gives a little insight into what was going on behind the scenes as the buildings were being built and planned and so forth. I mean it isn't going to be very extensive for you. Or very comprehensive.

EN: Yeah.

JR: But it's interesting.

EN: Yeah. Yeah. I kinda remember that from, from, I started last year to look through the presidential boxes. And I do kinda remember those minutes.

JR: When did you come here?

EN: When did I come here?

JR: Yeah.

EN: Well, I I was here in um, I had a part time appointment in, starting in '79, '80. And I finished my thesis, my Doctoral thesis. And then I went away and taught in Pennsylvania.

JR: Oh, really.

EN: During the middle '80s. And then I came back in 1989.

JR: Oh, okay.

EN: That's when I came back for a full time appointment.

JR: Where did you finish your doctorate?

EN: At Stanford.

JR: At Stanford. So, you were here writing your thesis still?

EN: Yes.

JR: You were already teaching here when you wrote your thesis.

EN: Yes. I wrote my thesis in the '70s. But I was a mom you know.

JR: Oh, yeah. I mean, you know.

EN: I wasn't really here at all.

JR: You were the critical, mom, husband, mom, wife all that stuff. Right.

EN: Yeah. Right.

JR: Ah.

EN: Yeah. I went to a Benedictine College St. Vincent. Latrobe, Pennsylvania.

JR: Really?

EN: Yeah. It's a lovely place.

JR: Those small liberal arts colleges.

EN: If I could have talked Norman into moving there, and then we would've probably moved [EN laughs]. Still be there.

JR: Yeah, well. I'm very devoted to the liberal arts myself. My son went to Carrollton. Graduated Carrolton.

EN: Oh, that's good. Nice.

JR: Oh, it's a great place.

EN: Sam Grints [phonetic], Chris went there too.

JR: Yeah. Yeah, it's just a wonderful place. And you know and then, my idea of an undergraduate education is liberal arts. Nothing more. I mean I came from a state thinking you have a bachelor's degree in Business or Engineering. I think you ought to get liberal arts and then take a year or two to do what you need to do to get a job. But that's neither here nor there.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Ah, okay. You have notes here. The IBHE. Well.

EN: You told me about the meeting with that. That's what I wondered. That's where I had seen that you were involved in these meetings for developing the definitions. JR: Yes. Trying to develop the. The big problem in the early days was as I said, that everybody was coming to the legislature with their hands out because enrollments were going crazy.

EN: Yeah.

JR: It was the Vietnam era. I I mean, I have a pretty standard 1960s view of Vietnam I guess [EN laughs]. It was a mess.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And everybody was trying to avoid the draft with good reason. Not everybody came out like Dick Cheney and George Bush and ultimately came out being big war heroes, you know, or big hawks.

EN: Yeah. Right [EN laughs].

JR: I mean, you know, but a lot of the enrollment. I mean two things were happening at the same time. The war was there, which pushed a lot. Because people...

EN: Yeah.

JR: Could get deferments by coming to college, but also there were just huge numbers of people. Huge numbers of kids that needed higher education.

EN: Right.

JR: Enrollments were just growing all over the place. The State established a system of Community Colleges in the early '60s. Or in the first five years of the '60s thereabouts. There was money being spent all over the place, and everybody wanted more and more. I mean, we doubled almost enrollment in about five years. The Legislature did not feel comfortable with just putting the money on the stump. I mean they wanted a way as I said earlier.

EN: Yes.

JR: They wanted a way to do it rationally. And that's what led to the Unit Cost Study and ah, to using the Unit Cost Study as a formula. To develop a formula for funding.

EN: Yes.

JR: So funding on the way up, as enrollments were growing, funding on the way up was very successful with these formulas. I'm glad to have had a part of it. Funding on the way down was also a part of it [EN laughs].

EN: That was a good point. What a wonderful point.

JR: And I mean that same formula is worked on the way down.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: When enrollments started dropping. And our. We actually, as a matter of fact, SIU Edwardsville is a very good example of what was happening. We got a lot of money very quickly because our enrollments were growing, but the way the formula worked at that time was really in a very unsophisticated fashion. It really didn't make much differentiation among disciplines and levels. So, there was per-student cost. That was about it. And we got it. Once it became more sophisticated, it became evident that we were the highest. We were the most overfunded, quote, "over-funded" University in the State by about 1978-79.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Thereabouts. It was fun to be a part of that.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Stressful. [EN laughs] I hope I had a good... You mention. You have a note here about counting public service in the 1980s.

EN: Yes, well Sally Ferguson made a big deal about that, that you were the one who got Public Service into the formula.

JR: Oh. Yeah.

EN: She said it was your idea to put Public Service in the formula.

JR: I was, the the....

EN: To account for faculty, money spent on faculty. And that some of that was related to their public service.

JR: Well, it started turning out as follows. I had mentioned earlier. The earliest formula funding, just trying to develop formulas, was just said per student. And it was very unsophisticated.

EN: Yes.

JR: And I was on that first committee, that earliest committee meet. Where we decided, we tried to sort our Public Service and Organized Research as well, ah, trying to make a more honest cost study. Well, when the time came that enrollments were changing and people got more sophisticated, they looked at SIU Edwardsville, and they said, "You're one of the highest cost universities in the State."

EN: Yeah.

JR: At that point ah, people weren't paying enough attention to public service activities. And when they said you're, were one of the highest cost in the state it was based on instruction only.

EN: Mhm-mm.

JR: Okay. And I made the case up there that they should, if they're going to do that, then they have to recognize that Public Service activities are taking place too, and that comes out of the equation.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And that money is not part of instruction. And yeah, it's true. I made a very strong case for it. But even more important I came back here and made sure that everybody, that all the faculty and professional staff were reporting their Public Service activities and Organized Research. Organized Research was a no-brainer.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: You tied it to a grant or it wasn't Organized Research.

EN: Yes.

JR: It was then part of instruction. Public Service was different. People were doing all sorts of activities and weren't reporting it properly. I didn't think they were.

EN: Uh-huh. Now is this form that is used here, was that, is that unique to our institution. The yellow form that everybody fills out?

JR: Probably. The the, I'd say that the formula. I haven't seen it recently. It's probably not changed.

EN: It hasn't changed, no.

JR: I redesigned it in the early, ah, I don't know when I redesigned it, late 1970s because I wanted to get a better handle on Public Service.

EN: Uh-huh. Yeah.

JR: The design of it is probably fairly unique to us. The actual categories of Instruction, Direct Instruction, Indirect Instruction, Departmental Research---all those things are State-wide.

EN: Okay.

JR: Those are defined. Those are the kind of things we established in the late 60s, early 70s, all of that structure and how to do that study, how to gather the data, where you had to put it, how you had to count it, those sorts of things. So, that form, the form you see here is not State-wide, but the form itself somehow collecting all that money somehow is supposed to be done statewide.

EN: Okay.

JR: Some institutions aren't very good at it.

EN: Now, that's what Sally said. She said some institutions have never really gotten into the research.

JR: They have never really. I don't think a lot of institutions have really understood from a, from a management, I'm talking now from a, from a, "How do you asses?" Well you know, realistically. How do you look at a big university like this and assess how to distribute the money? How do I know which department chairman is yelling the loudest? Is that the way I'm going to fund you? The Unit Cost Study. And I think I was the first to use it internally. A lot of people... I was lucky, because I was working for people who understood it and who were willing to take the risk of being said, "You're using a sledgehammer and a formula to make budget decisions."

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And they were willing to say, "No, it's just the beginning." I always felt it as just a beginning, but I'm certain that maybe even most institutions don't use it that way, internally, and they're missing a really good analytical tool, I think.

EN: I can see, just from looking at the presidential boxes that your studies are just so valued. and they're really appreciated. And they seem to be. It seemed to me that, when the IBHE got really started, John Rendleman was really hammered by them, and then, and then you began to address the data problem, and then, by the time of Earl Lazerson...

JR: Well, I appreciate that.

EN: You really could deal with the IBHE on their own terms.

JR: Yes. The thing is Earl was willing to do it. And, as I said, I was fortunate enough to be around people who had the courage and look and say, "These numbers have value."

EN: Yeah.

JR: But the thing up until, somebody says, "Oh you can't measure what's going on in Higher Education. Or what's going on in a classroom." No we cant. But I mean that's not what we're trying to do. But here's the reality of it "somebody is looking at numbers." And we better figure a way to use that, those numbers as honestly as we can to run our own internal affairs, at least to begin the discussion. Those numbers are not quality indicators whatsoever.

EN: No.

JR: And I used to say, "Look. Just because one Department looks like it's over-funded, maybe you want it to be, but you have to have the courage to start somewhere." And it takes even more courage to say to that department and other departments to say that, "This is the one."

EN: Yeah.

JR: And Lazerson would do that. And Werner would do that. I-I think that was. But that was missing prior to that. I'll tell ya. I've got to tell you. Two of my ah, the things that I valued most. Or were the most fun to do, three things that were the most fun to do in Institutional Research. Because actually working with these dollars wasn't all that much fun. [EN laughs] It was ah, challenging. And yeah it was fun in a way. It's always fun to see something accomplished. But I really liked to work with other kinds of studies. I would have loved to do some of the things Sally's doing with student progress and such.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: I could never do it. Because I didn't have the time. But, early on when I came Jed [phonetic] White was Chairman of the Chemistry Department and they were using a departmental test to place students in let's just call it Chemistry I, Chemistry II. To appropriately pace students in the beginning Chemistry sequence, and they weren't happy it was working because a lot of the students in the first course knew more Chemistry than they thought they did, and second course didn't know as much.

EN: Yes.

JR: So, they weren't happy with their internally developed test. So I did a comparative study using their test and ACT um, Science Composite and compared the two and found and demonstrated that the combination ACT Chemistry composite and I think maybe rank in class [EN laughs] was far superior to predicting success in these two courses than anything they did internally.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: And it was immediately challenged. All departments think they can write better tests than anybody. What the hell. I mean you're a historian. You know more about history than anybody, you know. [EN laughs] So, but I demonstrated. And they changed it, and Jed -word got around on that. And Jed, ah, you know people began to come in and talk to me about things. The second thing I did. Salaries were always a big problem. [EN laughs] And and I did early on I did a salary study, male and female, comparing male and female. And showed that the females were really pretty badly under-funded. There was a lot of money reallocated because of that, but at the same time, I did that it also showed that their were a lot of discrepancies across the board on that, and so that study, which was really pretty unsophisticated, to tell the truth, because it did not take into account any kinds of salary pressures or determinations from outside of SIUE, it strictly was based on internal numbers. And it's based on you know, how long you've been here. How old are you? What rank.

EN: Yeah.

JR: Kinda standardized thing.

EN: Yes.

JR: But again I always tried to provide a base of numbers that they'd stand on and say, "Why is it like this?" And begin to make their own decisions and make people face reality and defend, I mean if i'm two times over the average on cost, why? If I can't defend it-I shouldn't have that money.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: But anyway, same thing with salaries. You know. I showed that women were, there were great discrepancies between the genders here, so I was very proud of that. Later on, [JR coughs] ah, right before, ah, I became the Director of Planning and Resource Management and and ah, I appointed Sally [Ferguson] as Director of Institutional Research, I did a ah, University-wide salary study based on knowledge of salaries outside the University. I put together a group of 12 to 15 universities that were comparable universities and we did it by discipline. And that showed the discrepancies. It didn't deal with gender. It just assumed that gender wasn't entering into it. Which I know better. But, it showed such things. And I was quite proud of that. Because it really provided some good data for people to look at salaries in the institution.

EN: Was this when Marsha. Were these the equity studies that Marsh Puro tried to implement?

JR: Yes.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: She probably did. Yes. I didn't use the data I just generated it. But I mean, I could look at, it allowed us to look at our Departments by the discipline in which they fell. And compare salaries on a disciplinary. Now it has a down side, the truth of the matter is, but the numbers show

it. Unfortunately, Engineers and Business, Engineering and Business are going to get paid a hell of a lot more than History and a lot more than Art, and Music and Drama.

EN: Yes.

JR: I mean. I looked at that and it used to really upset me, but that's the fact of the matter.

EN: Yes.

JR: That's the marketplace. So I was really quite proud of the fact that I could at least provide some reflection of the academic marketplace consisting of similar institutions to our situation. So those two things- I really enjoyed doing it. All the rest of the stuff I think I contributed to the welfare of the institution. I enjoyed doing them. It was a challenge always. I enjoyed very much trying to get the welfare of SIU translated into procedures of the Board of Higher Education without being unprincipled or dishonest. And I think I did that. Because I'm absolutely confident I've never done anything dishonest with those people, even with those people, when it was a temptation to do so.

EN: Yeah.

JR: It's very tempting to get into. And I'm- and Loren Jung, I mentioned who hired me, Director of Institutional Research, J-U-N-G.

EN: Oh, J-U-N-G.

JR: Yeah. Yep, a good German, ah, he taught me an enormous amount. Because he's the one who took me to these committees, and once I was a Director, I was on Committee, you know, on my own position. Ah, but he taught me an enormous amount. And just listening to him and watching him, I got such a good sense of how to interact with the Board of Education on a technical basis.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: I was better than him sometimes at getting the numbers, and getting the technical part of it. But he taught me a lot about, when it had to do with - how to interact with the committees, how to get your point apart, and above all, that you act with the best interests of your university in mind as the first principle.

EN: So he was your mentor?

JR: He was.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Yeah he was. In the first, probably, in the first three or four years. Now I did some things for him too. Now, he knew some things that I didn't know. Now it was a good relationship. It really

was. We're very good friends, and he's a wonderful man. But he's a one... He was, he was just outrageously pro- Southern [Illinois University]. University of Illinois was the enemy. They were Ellen [EN laughs]. They still are. The University, well you've got to remember hell, when I started working here, the University of Illinois would not recognize Engineering at Carbondale.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: They would not recognize Engineering here. They fought the Medical School establishment. They fought the Dental School establishment. They fought the Law School establishment.

EN: Yes.

JR: All of those things. The University of Illinois did not want that to happen. Because they wanted to. They're the ones who do that.

EN: Right.

JR: And so, I can't say. I know the guys who were working up there and got along fine with them, but ah, there was a degree of condescension always.

EN: Uh-huh.

JR: Always a degree of condescension. But, I'd like to think I changed a couple of their minds too.

EN: Uh-huh. [EN and JR both laugh]

JR: Because I got em' in a couple of instances. But it was fun, it was real.

EN: Well.

JR: Are you having a good time? Is that all? Do you have another question?

EN: Uh-huh. Yes, I. No. No. I think-my questions.

JR: I filled up plenty of pages for you.

EN: All my questions in. [Recording stops]